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Reference Code: 2021/100/14

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FOR SEC GALLAGHER FROM AMBASSADOR

1. I met for about an hour with Secretary of State Mowlam at the beginning of her Washington visit. Part of our discussion took place in the presence of her entourage (the British Ambassador and his deputy Mr Cary, and Messrs Lindsay, Jeffreys and Reid from the NIO), and part with her alone.
2. In the discussion with officials two points were raised: There was a general concern to shore up David Trimble, and some sense that this required helping the Orange Order out of its present quandary. Dr Mowlam was cautiously hopeful - or at least not despondent - on the "proximity talks". I said we were all anxious to help Trimble but cautioned against the assumption that this meant trying to rehabilitate him with the Orange Order. No one could object to helping the Orange Order as a fraternal organisation advancing positive Protestant values. It would be a grave mistake to support the Order on the role of a political lever or a sectarian anti-Catholic organisation. Trimble had to an extent been got off the Drumcree "hook" he had helped originally to create, by the ineptitude of the Orange leaders, and he should be encouraged to break the links rather than to restore a relationship that was manifestly past its sell-by date. A local accommodation on Drumcree itself was being worked on very assiduously, including by Dublin, but the British side needed to be very

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careful not to be perceived as extending a lifeline to the sectarian brand of Orangism.

- agreed
Jalley*
3. The second concern related to Martin Galvin and the prospect of U.S. funds flowing to Republican dissidents. It was clear that PM Blair sees this as an area to become engaged in both for substantive and optical reasons, and was anxious to link President Clinton to it. I cautioned on the need for perspective. Galvin was largely discredited in New York (a key fund-raising centre). He obviously hoped to use the prospective young prisoners arrested in London as a platform for fundraising, but this was likely to be at a fairly artisanal level, unless the British media or security services glamourised him - as they seemed about to do. Provisional Sinn Féin so far seemed in control of the more significant Republican networks. Unless the peace process went seriously against them they would probably continue to do so. A disproportionate campaign on a funding problem that hardly yet existed would not be well-advised in Irish-American terms.
 4. I took the opportunity to convey our concerns that the drafting of the Settlement Bill showed a bias on the part of the technical drafters towards the intentional or optional, as opposed to the operational, on many of the equality areas. They should be very clear that Sinn Féin's ability to sustain the process or otherwise would depend directly on their perception of the equality agenda, so that cunning drafting might be a pyrrhic victory. I urged strongly that equality should be put "up in lights" in a forthright way as the organising principle. Anything else would be a bonus for dissident republicans.
 5. In our private conversation Dr Mowlam was particularly concerned that the growth of dissident Republican groups could inhibit the changes on security arrangements on the ground needed to reassure Sinn Féin, and thus create a kind of vicious circle. She

was lyrical in her compliments to the Garda on their success so far, but resigned that inevitably some attacks could succeed. (The rocket attack in Newry that evening, represented an advance in technique that was obviously worrying). Without minimising the dangers, I pointed to the key difference in terms of political support. If the process was seen to work, that absence of political support would ultimately prove decisive. If the Agreement was implemented in good faith I believed everything would fall into place, but they should be careful on "clawbacks" intended to be helpful to Trimble. Other ways should be found to shore him up.

6. She expressed concerns at the various hurdles still to be overcome, and about Trimble's capacity (in spite of his political growth since the Agreement) to make the necessary political decisions in Autumn. She also rehearsed her difficulties in her dialogue with Sinn Féin. She agreed very fervently however that momentum in the implementation of the Agreement was the key, and that she personally would be doing her utmost to instill that momentum in the Autumn. She spoke most appreciatively of her relationship with Dublin and looked forward to her meeting there later this week.

ENDS